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ABSTRACT 
In the spirit of examining humor contextually, we consider a basic question in this essay: do different 
humor types “play by the same rules,” cognitively speaking? We examine the relationship between 
humor and cognitive processing style, as operationalized through Need for Cognition. We find that 
humor based on disparagement processes “breaks through” the cognitive differences inherent in 
incongruity humor. Rather than exhibiting incongruity-based humor's affective response transferring to 
attitude for low-NFC subjects, and more centrally-employing high NFC subjects' higher tendency to 
dismiss the humor's effect on overall attitude, disparagement based humor is processed the same by both 
low- and high-NFC respondents. Overall, our findings suggest that the relationship between cognitive 
processing (as operationalized through Need for Cognition) and resultant attitudes is a complicated one, 
strongly contingent on humor type. Were only incongruity-based humor utilized, our findings would 
have reinforced Zhang’s (1996b) assertion that a person’s Need for Cognition will play a key role in the 
evaluation of humor, but our results suggest that a more complex conceptualization of the relationship 
between humor and attitude formation is required when humor is treated as a potentially more 
complicated, context-dependent construct. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the link between a consumer's underlying motivation to engage in cognitive activity 
(Need for Cognition, or NFC) and the efficacy of different types of humor. Humor stands as one of the 
most utilized execution elements in consumer communication as various forms of it are employed in 
around 20% of television advertisements (Beard 2008). There is no debating that advertisers have 
certainly leveraged humor in advertising, but there is substantial debate as to the efficacy of humor-
based marketing communication efforts. Humor research has been complex; after undertaking a 
comprehensive review of the use of humor in advertising, Weinberger and Gulas (1992) conclude that 
“broad generalizations about the effect of humor in advertising are inappropriate” (p. 56). In this 
contextual spirit, the authors attempt to explicate the relationship of different types of humor 
(incongruity-based and disparagement-based) and consumer processing tendency  
COGNITION AND PROCESSING STYLE 
Researchers in a variety of fields have attempted to explicate attitude formation and change processes. 
Traditional theories stress the dominant role of effortful cognition in attitude formation. However, over 
the past few decades, researchers have been interested not only in cognitive-based effortful processing, 
but more “effortless” or automatic processing as well.  One such theory, the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM), is offered by Petty and Cacioppo (1981). The model features an elaboration likelihood 
continuum, where consumer persuasion after exposure to a stimulus depends on the degree to which 
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people elaborate on the information embedded within that stimulus. This theory posits that in a central 
processing, high-elaboration-likelihood situation, cognition ("think about something, and then form 
attitudes") will largely drive attitude formation. However, rather than taking the central role of cognition 
as a given, the model posits that when an individual engages in peripheral processing, various 
environmental cues may be used as "shortcuts" in attitude formation. Whether a person adopts a more 
central or more peripheral processing style is a function of individual differences and situational factors. 
  
Cacioppo and Petty (1982) define Need for Cognition (NFC) as “the tendency for an individual to 
engage in and enjoy thinking” (p. 116). The construct resulted from factor-analytic examinations of 
individuals' variation in this tendency; as Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, and Jarvis (1996) write, "much of 
the interindividual variation in people's tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors 
could be represented in terms of a single factor, which was called need for cognition" (p. 197).  
 
NFC is one of recent history’s most influential individual difference variables, having been extensively 
researched over the past 25 years and demonstrated to be related to other individual difference variables 
such as locus of control (Fletcher et al. 1986) as well as to moderate expectancies of success and 
achievement (Dickhauser and Reinhard 2006) and attitude change (Petty et al. 1993). NFC has been 
shown to influence the ultimate processing route that an individual uses (Cacioppo and Petty 1982), as 
low-NFC individuals tend to rely more on peripheral cues, whereas high-NFC individuals usually 
engage in high-elaboration central processing. The construct measures an individual’s intrinsic 
motivation and not intellectual ability (Cacioppo et al. 1996), and persons high (compared to low) on 
NFC usually demonstrate a more positive attitude toward stimuli and tasks which are characterized by or 
require greater cognitive effort. Since high-NFC individuals generally process information more deeply 
than those low in NFC (Cacioppo and Petty 1982), they are more likely to discount stimulus elements 
that they deem irrelevant as input to overall attitude formation.  
 
COGNITION AND HUMOR 
 
One of the dominant theories in humor research over the past two centuries has been Incongruity-
Resolution. It can be described generally as exposure to a stimulus that is “incongruous, surprising, 
peculiar, unusual, or different from what we normally expect” (Martin 2007, p. 63) which is resolved in 
a way that causes it to make sense. Incongruity theory is central to many modern theories of humor; for 
example, Raskin’s (1985) Semantic Script Theory, described by Simpson (2003) as:  “A text is a joke if: 
The text fits with (either wholly or partially) two different scripts (i.e., a knowledge structure)” and “the 
two scripts are opposite in a special sense” (p. 30). Theorists embracing this perspective typically view 
some types of incongruity as being a defining characteristic of humor (e.g., Apter 1982); for instance, 
Ruch (1988, p. 861) writes that “two structural parameters are considered to be essential ingredients in 
all kinds of humour: incongruity…and the resolution of the incongruity” and Ruch and Hehl write “there 
is general agreement about the existence of this two-stage structure in the process of perceiving and 
understanding humor” (1998, p. 114). Thus, incongruity-resolution has been presented by some as an 
essential characteristic of humor. 
 
While the degree to which an individual is motivated to elaborate on a stimulus has limited face validity 
as a predictor of how funny that individual will perceive a stimulus to be, it may play an important 
differential role in the resulting attitude formation. In general, humor has been hypothesized to be more 
subject to peripheral than central processing (Martin 2007), but whether a humorous message influences 
resultant attitude formation might vary depending on the cognitive motivation of the message recipient 
or the strength of the advertising claims (Cline and Kellaris 1999). For instance, in an advertising 
setting, highly motivated, central processors who score high on NFC might base their attitudes on 
relevant, useful information (e.g., objective product ratings) and ignore peripheral aspects like humor, 
whereas low-NFC individuals may use a "this is funny, so I like it"-type heuristic and thus allow humor 
evaluation a direct effect on attitude formation. While past research has indicated that humor presence 
generally increases favorable attitudes toward an object (e.g., an advertisement), this basic process is 
likely to work differently for low- and high-NFC individuals, with those low on NFC being more likely 
to rely on peripheral cues in forming attitudes toward an object, thus making the conventional wisdom 
of “humor increases liking” more likely to occur. In other words, a low-NFC message recipient may let 
a basic affective response (“this is funny”) shape his or her overall attitude of the humorous object (“this 
is funny, so I like this”). Along the same lines, a high-NFC person is less likely to allow an affective cue 
(“this is funny”) to shape his or her overall attitude and will likely seek to engage cognitively when 
developing that attitude. Similarly to how attractiveness bias is less pronounced in high-NFC versus 
low-NFC participants, a “humor bias” of sorts will play less of a role in high-NFC versus low-NFC 
subjects in forming overall attitudes towards an object.  
Zhang (1996a; 1996b) found evidence of this phenomenon, with brand attitudes and purchase intent 
measured after participants’ exposure to print humorous ads lower (higher) for participants with high 
(low) NFC scores. Interestingly, Geuens and De Pelsmacker (2002) failed to replicate those results 
finding that humor had a universally positive effect on respondents’ attitudes towards advertisements 
and the advertising brands. Both Zhang and Geuens and De Pelsmacker used incongruity-resolution 
based humor in an advertising setting, but it is worth noting that while Zhang's humorous manipulation 
(a cartoon with a pun about "shooting first and asking questions later") was tied directly to the brand (a 
camera, with the ad pointing out the need to "ask questions" before "shooting pictures"), Geuens and De 
Pelsmacker's stimulus was unrelated to the brand.  
HUMOR PROCESSES: BEYOND COGNITION 
Different underlying processes have been theorized as causing humor beside incongruity-resolution. For 
instance, humor is often hypothesized as stemming from a disparagement process.  In disparagement, 
the humor functions as an attempt at establishing superiority, a tool to “include” some and “isolate” 
others (e.g., ethnic and sexist humor), or to allow us to "feel we are better than others" (Beard 2008, p. 
47). This conceptualization treats humor as a form of aggression; as Martin (1998) writes, “Aristotle, for 
example, concluded that laughter arises primarily in response to weakness and ugliness” (p. 29). Hobbes 
shared this view, and in the 18th century ridicule was a popular technique of debate. Many prominent 
researchers continue to espouse the importance of disparagement in the genesis of humor, a sentiment 
echoed by Gruner (1996) who asserts that “to understand a piece of humorous material it is necessary 
only to find out who is ridiculed, how, and why” (as cited in Martin 1998, p. 29). Disparagement, when 
coupled with a playful cue indicating that a stimulus is humorous and not simply mean or abusive, is at 
the heart of a significant amount of humorous communication.   
Speculation that different humor types may be processed differently has been researched with some 
success. For instance, Goel and Dolan (as cited in Martin 2007) examined brain activity by utilizing 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), finding that participants listening to jokes featuring more complex 
incongruity (i.e., semantic jokes) more extensively utilized temporal lobes involved in language 
understanding, while those who listened to sound-based simple puns (i.e., phonological jokes) more 
extensively utilized the speech-processing left frontal lobe. Per the consideration here, given their 
inherently different natures (i.e. conative versus cognitive), it is posited that disparagement- and 
incongruity-based humor may result in differing application, based on cognitive processing differences, 
of humor evaluation. Whereas incongruity-based humor is a less personally involving process, the more 
personal, conatively driven disparagement humor might be more difficult for low-NFC participants to 
simply treat as a peripheral cue.  
The Encyclopedia of Psychology entry under "Motivation: Philosophical Theories" describes the 
difference between cognitive and conative aspects as cognitive states having "a more subordinate role 
[in motivation]," whereas a more conative process is "capable of triggering action." It is speculated here 
that humor based on disparagement could theoretically “break through” the cognitive “barrier” 
characteristic of incongruity-driven humor. In other words, if a humorous advertisement featured strong 
disparagement humor, it may be more transparent to consumers and, in turn, the humor may have a 
greater effect on resultant evaluations. Rather than exhibiting the differential effects of incongruity-
based humor on attitudes across low- and high-NFC individuals, whereby affective response directly 
transfers to attitude for low-NFC, but not high-NFC message recipients who display a tendency to 
employ central processing that weakens the humor's effect on overall attitude, disparagement based 
humor might be processed centrally by both low- and high-NFC respondents. Thus, this research posits 
that moving from incongruity-based humor to disparagement-based humor should effectively erase any 
NFC-driven attitudinal differences.   
HYPOTHESES 
Based on the preceding conceptual development, authors offer the following formal hypotheses: 
H1a: In an incongruity-based humor setting, participants will assign a higher humor evaluation to 
a humor-containing stimulus than a non-humorous stimulus. 
H1b: In a disparagement-based humor setting, participants will assign a higher humor evaluation 
to a humor-containing stimulus than a non-humorous stimulus. 
H2a: The effect of incongruity-based humor on corresponding attitudes will be moderated by a 
participant's NFC, whereby attitudes of participants lower in NFC will be higher in the presence 
of humor compared to when humor is not present, but for participants higher in NFC, humor will 
have no effect on attitudes. 
H2b: The effect of disparagement-based humor on corresponding attitudes will not be moderated 
by participants' NFC.   
STIMULUS DEVELOPMENT AND PRETESTS 
A five-step pretesting process was conducted to find a source image to use in conducting the 
experiment. In the first step of the process, an internet search was performed to select a number of 
pictures that would form the core of the stimuli. As the authors needed to utilize a non-humorous control 
condition, pictures that were prima-facie humorous in and of themselves, such as a baby in large 
sunglasses, were discarded.  Pictures that would not easily lend themselves to humor, such as 
photographs of a cemetery, were also discarded.  A total of 15 pictures were selected from the initial set 
after discarding ones that did not meet the aforementioned criteria. Next, attitudes towards these pictures 
were tested. Thirty-nine undergraduate students, who volunteered to participate in the study, were each 
presented with a fifteen-page booklet, with each page containing one of the pictures and scales 
measuring humor evaluation and attitude towards the picture (henceforth Apicture). Three students 
declined to reveal their gender, and thus thirty-six usable booklets (20 female, 16 male) were obtained.  
Humor evaluation was measured using a six-item, seven-point, semantic differential scale 
(Chattopadhyay and Basu 1990) (humorous/not humorous, funny/not funny, amusing/not amusing, 
boring/not boring, playful/not playful, dull/not dull). Apicture was measured using a three-item, seven-
point semantic scale (favorable/unfavorable, good/bad, like very much/dislike very much). Reliabilities 
were above the commonly accepted cut-off for Cronbach’s α of .80 for all but one picture, with humor 
evaluation reliabilities ranging from α=.85 to α=.94 and Apicture reliabilities ranging from α=.81 to α=.95. 
 
To test for gender differences, a series of one-way ANOVAs with gender as the independent variable 
and humor evaluation and Apicture as dependent variables were run. No significant differences were 
found with humor evaluation as the dependent variable (all F’s < 1.58, all p’s > .10). However, some 
gender differences in the attitude towards the picture were observed. The attitude scores of the male 
participants were higher for pictures of a laptop (M = 5.1 vs. 4.3, F(1,34) = 6.5, p < .02), a yacht (M = 
5.0 vs. 4.3, F(1,34) = 4.8, p < .04), and people skiing (M = 4.8 vs. 4.3, F(1,34) = 4.2, p < .05). Male 
participants' attitudes were also directionally lower for a picture of a picnic (M = 4.0 vs. 3.5, F(1,34) = 
2.9, p < .10). Female relative to male participants had a marginally higher score for a picture of shoppers 
(M = 4.4 vs. 4.0, F(1,34) = 2.4, p < .14). Next, subjects’ attitudes towards the pictures were evaluated. 
The mean attitude scores varied considerably, with “skydivers” (M = 4.3) scoring the highest, and 
“traffic jam” (M = 1.7) the lowest. The attitudinal differences between these highest and lowest liked 
pictures were statistically significant (t (35) = 9.2, p < .01). In order to avoid both potential ceiling 
effects and a situation where participants would fundamentally dislike the source object, the authors 
sought pictures that were “moderately liked", that is, those whose attitude rating was significantly higher 
than the rating of the lowest rated picture (“traffic jam”), but significantly lower than the rating of the 
best-liked one (“skydivers”). Thus, pictures of an airport (M = 2.1) and a broken-down car (M = 1.9) 
were eliminated because their ratings were similar to that of the picture of the traffic jam (both p’s 
> .10).  In terms of humor evaluation, the picture with the highest mean score (“skydivers”, M = 4.2) 
was rated significantly funnier than any other picture (p < .01) and was discarded. This left us with four 
options that met all three objectives of the pretest for the humor setting –“bike riders”, “dancers”, 
“joggers”, and “yard sale” – which were used for the remaining steps of the stimulus development 
process.  
 
Next, three captions to accompany every picture were developed. The first one was merely descriptive 
of the picture and contained no humor. The second one contained disparagement-based humor, while the 
third one contained incongruity-based humor. We next conducted two pretests to ensure that the humor 
processes had been correctly operationalized through the selected captions. First, we asked two judges 
whether or not they thought the captioned pictures successfully achieved the humor presence as well as 
the intended dominant humor processes (incongruity-resolution or disparagement) when humor was 
present. A training manual was prepared and used in familiarizing the judges with the two humor 
processes. In addition to seeing the examples of each humor process provided in the manual, judges 
were asked to think of examples that they could recall having seen. Each training session lasted 
approximately one hour. One week later, the judges were given a brief refresher on the processes and 
started coding the captioned pictures independent of each other by completing a forty-five page booklet. 
Each page contained a captioned picture (one of the 15 pictures and either a no-humor, disparagement-
based humor, or incongruity-based humor caption). Care was taken to make the judging a challenging 
endeavor in order to minimize the possible capitalizing on chance; therefore, judges were instructed that 
the three captions accompanying each picture are not necessarily of the three different types, even 
though they always were. Finally, judges were given a fourth answer option, “other humor type”, for the 
instances when they thought humor was present, but they felt neither disparagement nor incongruity-
resolution were responsible for it. To sum up, for each captioned picture, judges first determined 
whether or not humor was present, and if they answered yes, they were instructed to determine what the 
dominant humor process (disparagement, incongruity, or “other”) was. For each of the 45 captioned 
pictures the judges correctly identified the non-humorous and the humorous ones. The judges agreed on 
the second question (dominant humor process) 26 out of 30 times (87%). The three pictures that had at 
least one caption with disagreement between the judges (“airport”, “bike riders”, and “broken-down 
car”) were deemed to have failed the pretest.  
Second, authors confirmed this expert evaluation through a pretest with participants similar to those we 
would use in the studies. Thirty-three undergraduate students were given a lecture on humor processes 
and reviewed examples of disparagement- and incongruity-based humor. During the next 30 minutes the 
students were split into 8 groups. Each group had between three and five members and there was at least 
one male and one female on every team. Each group was given one fifteen-page booklet to complete. 
Each page contained one of the pictures, and the three captions that went with it. The groups were asked 
to identify whether humor was present in each caption, and if so, what the dominant humor process was 
(“other humor process” was again included as an option). The groups worked independently of each 
other. While, once again, all no-humor captions were correctly identified, group responses for only two 
of the source pictures (“hiking” and “yard sale”) had 100% agreement with the hypothesized humor 
processes. The rest of the potential stimuli were discarded.  
Thus, ultimately, one picture-caption set (“yard sale”) emerged as the optimal stimulus for the situation. 
The picture was simply an image of a yard sale in progress, with a few people in the midst of it. The 
non-humorous caption was “Lots of great bargains can be found at a yard sale,” the incongruity-humor 
caption was “Sure, the basketball hoop is for sale—but you have to get it down!” and the disparagement-
humor caption was “I can’t believe I paid money for this junk when it was new, much less that these 
jokers are buying it used!” 
EXPERIMENT 
Method and Participants 
Participants were 157 students at a large American university. Students were instructed that their 
participation in the study was completely voluntary. They completed the study during undergraduate 
class sessions, following a guest lecture by one of the authors. The study was in the form of a pencil-
and-paper booklet which contained a captioned picture (the moderately-liked “yard sale” picture) with 
either a humorous or a non-humorous caption, dependent measures, and an NFC scale, all interspersed 
among other non-related exercises. Attitude and humor evaluation were measured through the same 
scales used in the first pretest: humor evaluation was measured using a six-item, seven-point, semantic-
differential scale (Chattopadhyay and Basu 1990; humorous/not humorous, funny/not funny, 
amusing/not amusing, boring/not boring, playful/not playful, dull/not dull) and attitude towards the 
captioned picture (ACP) was measured through a three-item, seven-point semantic-differential scale 
(favorable/ unfavorable, good/bad, like very much/dislike very much). Participants also completed the 
18-item shortened NFC scale developed by Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao (1984). This scale has been found 
to be both valid and gender neutral in a number of studies (see Cacioppo et al. 1996). Each NFC item 
was measured on a five-point scale, with 5 representing “extremely characteristic,” and 1 representing 
“extremely uncharacteristic.” Half of the items were reverse scored. Participants completed the booklet, 
including non-related exercises, in approximately 20 minutes. Participants were then debriefed and 
thanked for their participation.  
 
Preliminary Validation 
 
A manipulation check was conducted to determine if both humor manipulations were successful. Gender 
was also included as an independent variable to ensure that the efforts to create gender-neutral humorous 
captioned pictures were successful. A two-way ANOVA was conducted with humor evaluation as 
dependent variable and humor type (no-humor, disparagement-based, incongruity-based) and gender 
(female, male) as the independent variables. Humor evaluation was significantly higher in the presence 
of both disparagement (M = 4.53) and incongruity (M = 4.64) humor types than when humor was not 
present (M = 2.21, F(5,150) = 27.66, p < .01); post-hoc simple effect tests with Bonferroni adjustment 
of each humor type versus the control condition confirmed these differences were significant (both p < 
.01). Thus, each humor manipulation was deemed successful. Further, there was neither a significant 
main effect of gender (p > .47), nor a two-way interaction of humor presence x gender (p > .19).     
 
Reliability analyses indicated that the rating scales of both dependent variables were acceptable, with 
Cronbach’s α = .94 for the six-item humor evaluation composite, and α = .90 for the four-item ACP 
composite. Likewise, the NFC scale was successfully implemented as Cronbach’s α = .94 with no 
individual item's deletion resulting in a substantially higher coefficient alpha.  
 
Results 
 
A series of regressions were conducted to test the hypotheses. Thus the three-level humor manipulation 
was coded into two variables according to the humor process present (DISP and INCON), with NFC 
treated as a continuous variable. Separate variables were created for the two-way interactions of humor 
presence and NFC (DISPxNFC and INCONxNFC). Per Aiken and West (1991), scores for the NFC 
scale were centered (the mean NFC score, 3.4156, was subtracted from each participant's NFC score) in 
order to reduce potential multicollinearity. The regression model with humor evaluation as dependent 
variable was significant (F(5,151) = 27.11, p < .01, R2 = .47) with significant main effects for both types 
of humor: disparagement-based (β = .715, t(151) = 5.20, p < .01) and incongruity-based (β = .840, t(151) 
= 6.11, p < .01). No main effect was present for NFC (p > .83).  Likewise, the two-way interactions of 
NFC with each humor type were not significant (both p > .31) – individual differences in NFC didn’t 
have an impact on humor evaluation. The results of the analogous regression with ACP as dependent 
variable were significant (F(5,151) = 7.94, p < .01, R2 = .21). This regression analysis revealed that, as 
predicted, there was no two-way interaction between the disparagement-based humor and NFC (β = .21, 
t(151) = 1.22, p > .22). There was, however, a two-way interaction of incongruity-based humor and 
NFC (β = -.35, t(151) = -2.04, p < .05). These results provide initial support for the hypotheses that 
cognitive processing differences would indeed drive differential attitudinal results in the context of 
incongruity-based, but not disparagement humor. As expected, the latter universally increased attitude as 
evidenced by a main effect of disparagement-based humor (β = .60, t(151) = 4.39, p < .01) and the lack 
of the aforementioned DISPxNFC interaction.  
Next, the two humor conditions were analyzed independently. Per the hypothesized effects, in the 
incongruity-humor condition, the β-coefficient of NFC was significant and negative (β = -.707, t(49) = -
3.82, p < .01), whereas in the disparagement-humor condition it was not significant (β = -.148, t(53) = -
.68, p > .50). To explore the interaction of INCxNFC in more detail, a regression analysis on participants 
in the incongruity-based humor and no-humor conditions was conducted, which examined the 
interaction between NFC and incongruity presence (“yes” vs. “no”) at values one standard deviation 
above and below the mean of NFC (Aiken and West 1991; Hayes 2013). For participants with low NFC 
(at least one standard deviation below the mean of NFC), there was a significant interaction of 
incongruity presence and NFC, (β = -.733, t(103) = -4.07, p < .01). However, for participants with high 
NFC (at least one standard deviation above the mean of NFC), there was no significant interaction (β 
= .26, t(103) = .15, p > .88). In sum, this study supports the above-formulated hypotheses. As expected, 
regardless of their differing cognitive motivation levels (NFC), participants by and large found the 
humorous captions (both incongruity-based and disparagement-based) to be funny. Simply stated, a 
person's NFC doesn't appear to influence his or her appreciation of humor. However, NFC-driven 
differences did emerge when considering the potential humor-to-attitude chain of effects: disparaging 
humor did not interact with NFC, while incongruity-based humor did indeed interact with NFC – a 
result supporting H2a and H2b, and Zhang's findings (1996a). It appears that participants with high NFC 
levels are more likely to discount humor evaluation in forming their attitudes, whereas participants with 
low NFC levels use humor as a peripheral cue ("this is funny, so I like it") in attitude formation.  
DISCUSSION 
Humor is widely utilized in consumer settings, and it is important for marketing practitioners to 
understand the individual differences that may effectively heighten or dampen its impact. When such a 
variable interacts with a prevalent advertising executional element, for instance, marketers would 
obviously be concerned with understanding that process. This investigation, however, demonstrates how 
contextually challenging leveraging humorous communication can be: there is not a simple across-the-
board interaction between NFC and humorous content on resulting attitudes; instead, the relationship is 
rather nuanced and subtle.  
In an incongruity-based humorous setting, when low-NFC participants viewed a humorous captioned 
picture, they allowed their affective reaction to the humor to color their overall attitude towards the 
captioned picture, an effect that did not occur with high-NFC participants. Given their preference for 
cognitive activity using central processing, the latter do not allow the humor evaluation to determine 
their attitude towards the stimuli. The effect – or lack thereof – of humor evaluation on attitude is in line 
with NFC’s overall role as a motivational, not biological, personality variable. When humor is 
essentially a one-stage cognitive process (e.g., “is this funny?”), differences do not exist.  
However, differences in respondents’ processing style manifest themselves in defining the role of humor 
in attitude formation. Even then, the relationship between NFC and humor – and the resultant 
differential effect on attitudes – appears to be isolated to incongruity-based humor. This is not 
surprising, as this humor type offers perhaps the "best chance" for these cognitive processing differences 
to manifest themselves as incongruity-resolution humor has been identified as a mainly cognitive 
process and, therefore, the influence of a person’s NFC in situations where such humor is present should 
be relatively strong. In contrast, disparagement-based humor is seen as employing a less cognitive and 
more conative process which should diminish NFC’s role. In light of this distinction, it is not surprising 
that the relationship between NFC and humor is indeed contingent on the type of humor employed, with 
the more aggressive humor type in disparagement effectively erasing the differences between low- and 
high-NFC individuals. It could be speculated that this occurs because unlike incongruity-based humor 
which is processed differently by low- vs. high-NFC people, disparagement-based humor is likely 
processed centrally by both low- and high-NFC respondents.  
 
Overall, the outcome of this study suggests that the relationship between cognitive processing (as 
operationalized through NFC) and resultant attitudes is a complicated one, strongly contingent on humor 
type. Were only incongruity-based humor utilized, the results would have reinforced Zhang's (1996b) 
assertion that an individual's preferred cognitive processing style will play a key role in how humor 
affects attitude formation, but the current findings suggest that a more complex conceptualization of 
humor may be required if the effect is to be fully understood. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
One key limitation of this research and potential area for further research stems from the fact that only 
two humor processes – incongruity-resolution and disparagement – were utilized. There are other major 
humor processes that would be appropriate for a similar investigation. For instance, the arousal-safety 
type humor that has been conceptualized as primarily affective in nature (Speck 1991) was not utilized. 
Another potential humor type that would perhaps be ideal for a similar examination is sexual humor. 
Given its very nature, sexual humor seems, at face value, likely to be processed centrally by consumers 
and may affect attitudes in a manner similar to disparagement-based humor. However, given the debate 
as to whether there are fundamental gender-based differences in sexual humor appreciation and the 
speculation that men and women may exhibit fundamental differences in how they process it, it would 
be interesting to investigate whether, in the presence of sexual humor, NFC interacts with biological 
gender to affect the formation of resulting attitudes. Such an investigation would provide a richer view 
of the contingent relationship between NFC and humor.  
 
It also must be noted that the current studies were conducted in a non-marketing setting, as a simple 
captioned-picture stimulus was utilized. Although this was a conscious decision made in an attempt to 
avoid some of the potential confounds that Zhang (1996a; 1996b) and Geuens and De Pelsmacker 
(2002) faced, a key next step would be to examine the interplay of NFC and multiple humor types in a 
consumer setting (e.g., advertising). In particular, comparative advertising often seems to leverage 
disparaging humor (i.e., one brand mocking another) and although there is a rich literature on 
comparative advertising, there has been no investigation as to the efficacy of and the potential 
moderating and mediating variables in a humorous comparative advertising.  
 
A further limitation is that other potentially pertinent personality variables were not included in the 
study. For instance, humor’s effects are amplified in individuals high in Need for Humor (NFH), the 
motivation to process humorous stimuli (Kellaris and Cline 2007). These individuals consider humor to 
be an essential part of their lives, and self-identify as experts in its use.  The relationship between NFH 
and NFC has also been explored, and their interaction has been shown to influence the effect of humor 
on responses to ads (Cline, Altsech, and Kellaris 2003). Given that these studies, and much of our 
knowledge of humor’s effects on advertising efficacy, have been researched using incongruity-
resolution type humor, an important next step would be to explore disparagement-based and potentially 
other types (e.g., sexual) through the lens of Need for Humor.  
 
Finally, the sample of American undergraduate students this research was fielded with represents a 
serious limitation of the study. As humor has been demonstrated to possess universal as well as culture-
specific elements (Alden, Hoyer, and Lee 1993), it is not clear whether the results would hold in a 
different cultural context. A replication study with a cross-cultural sample of respondents would 
definitely identify boundary conditions for the documented effect and increase the generalizability of 
this research. 
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